As Google has moved from providing "ten blue links" to "universal search," controversy has erupted over whether Google is favoring its own specialized search results over competing specialized results offered by other entities. Google's competitors have complained about "search bias," and demanded that antitrust enforcers should ensure "search neutrality." Both the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the European Commission have considered these complaints. The FTC closed its investigation without taking any action, but the European Commission issued a formal statement of objections to Google in April 2015. This study empirically examines the impact of potential design remedies on search bias, including prominent links to rival specialized search services ("architectural remedies") and clearer labeling of Google's specialized search results ("labeling remedies"). This study finds that architectural remedies have much greater impact than labeling remedies. User awareness of labeling is low, and even labels far more explicit than those currently employed do not have much impact. Consumers have sticky expectations about how search results are presented, and their click-through behavior tracks those expectations irrespective of how the search results are labeled. However, major architectural changes can have a substantial impact on click-through rates. These findings suggest that the impact of architectural remedies will depend greatly on their design features, while labeling remedies are unlikely to have a significant impact. We explore the implications of these findings for other issues at the interface of Internet and intellectual property (IP) law. Financial support for this project was received from the McCarthy Institute, the University of San Francisco, and the University of Illinois. The McCarthy Institute has received unrestricted and restricted grants from various sources, including Microsoft and various law firms. After completing this article, Hyman and Franklyn were retained by Fairsearch to conduct an empirical study of the impact of Google's proposed commitments to the European Commission. We describe our findings from that study in a forthcoming article. We appreciate the helpful comments we received from Professors Ben Edelman and Eric Goldman, and from several anonymous referees.
[t]he role of general search engines ... was simply to generate a list of the most useful websites the 'ten blue links' in response to search queries. All three major search engines have since redesigned their products and evolved into integrated information portals, apparently in response to user desires. Among the changes was the introduction of "universal search" for certain types of queries. Universal search involves integrating the search engine's maps, images, videos, or other information it has created or compiled into its search results, and prominently displaying that proprietary content ahead of the blue links.").
2. See infra Part I.B. of sticky expectations about how search results are displayed, irrespective of how the results are labeled. These findings indicate the impact of architectural remedies (if any) will depend greatly on how they are designed, while labeling remedies (if any) are unlikely to have a significant impact. Regulators and judges should take account of these findings in considering the utility of ordering a remedy in the first instance-as well as the likely effect of whatever remedies they might ultimately order. Part I provides background on the dispute over search bias. Part II describes the methodology and results from the two surveys/simulations we conducted in the United States. Part III discusses various issues raised by our findings.
BACKGROUND ON SEARCH BIAS

A. Evolution of Google's Search Output
Originally, Google presented only unpaid search results that took the form of links to webpages created and maintained by other individuals and entities. 1 The specific uniform resource locators (URLs) that appeared were dictated by Google's PageRank algorithm.12 Over time, Google has made several important changes to this model. The first major change was the introduction of paid ads in 2000.13 These ads originally appeared only in the right-hand column of the SRP, but an increasing share of the SRP has become monetized. Ads now routinely appear in a colored box on top of the center column of the search output page, as well as in the right column of the search output page.14 Beginning in 2007, Google moved from a "ten blue links" model to "universal search.' 15 Instead of trying to simply provide links to other websites, Google began attempting to answer users' questions directly-and in some instances, imbedding the results of one or more "vertical searches" provided directly by Google. 16 Vertical search options include Google Maps, GFS, Google Local (previously known as Google Places), and Google Shopping. Google's critics complain that it "hard codes" the appearance of these vertical
JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: How GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE (2005).
12. Id. We refer to PageRank based search as "algorithmic search" throughout.
Id.
14. The labeling of Google's ads has evolved over time as well. At the outset, ads were labeled "Sponsored Links." Id. After Google created ad space in the shaded box in the center column, it relabeled the paid content in the center and right columns "Ads." Google occasionally places ads at the bottom of the SRP as well. As noted below, there is variation among search engines in the design of their SRP and the labeling of paid content over time. 16. Sullivan, supra note 15.
searches to ensure they appear near the top of the algorithmic search results, if not above them. 17 Google Shopping demonstrates the evolution of vertical search and its display on the Google SRP. The earliest incarnation was "Froogle," which was The Google Shopping region includes images of the specified products, and vendors must now pay to be included. Google Shopping generally appears in the center column, above unpaid search results, and below any paid ads that appear in the colored/shaded box on top of the center column of the SRP.
B. Complaints from Competitors
The dispute over search bias/neutrality originated in complaints from Google's competitors that they were being disadvantaged by changes in their algorithmic search ranking and placement, as well as by claims that Google was systematically disfavoring sites that competed with its own vertical search products. Several of these companies formed "Fairsearch," which has aggressively lobbied for the FTC and European Commission to bring an antitrust action against Google. 23 
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tag. 24 The former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust (Tom Barnett),
25
representing Expedia, testified at length about the problem of search bias. In response, the former head of the FTC's Bureau of Competition (Susan Creighton), who was representing Google, testified that Google's practices did 26 not raise antitrust concerns.
C. Antitrust Investigations of Search Bias
FTC
The FTC launched a formal investigation of Google's advertising and search practices in 2011. 27 The investigation was closed in 2013 with a settlement that did not address the issue of search bias. The FTC's press release made it clear that the agency found little merit in the claims regarding search bias and dismissed the argument that Google's practices raised antitrust concerns.
The FTC conducted an extensive investigation into allegations that Google had manipulated its search algorithms to harm vertical websites and unfairly promote its own competing vertical properties, a practice commonly known as "search bias." In particular, the FTC evaluated Google's introduction of "Universal Search" a product that prominently displays targeted Google properties in response to specific categories of searches, such as shopping and local to determine whether Google used that product to reduce or eliminate a nascent competitive threat. Similarly, the investigation focused on the allegation that Google altered its search algorithms to demote certain vertical websites in an effort to reduce or eliminate a nascent competitive threat. According to the Commission statement, however, the FTC concluded that the introduction of Universal Search, as well as additional changes made to Google's search algorithms even those that may have had the effect of harming individual competitors-could be plausibly justified as innovations that improved Google's product and the experience of its users. It
• • • 28
therefore has chosen to close the investigation. The settlement did include a separate "Letter of Commitment," in which Google promised to provide a mechanism whereby website owners could opt out of having their content appear on Google's vertical search options, including Google Shopping, G+ Local, GFS, Google Hotels, and Google Ad- 29 visor.
Google's critics were quite vocal about their unhappiness that the FTC settlement did not address search bias. 30 The issue was rekindled in 2015,
when a portion of a 2012 FTC staff report on the case was inadvertently disclosed to the Wall Street Journal. 31 The report showed that the FTC's Bureau of Competition concluded that Google had, in fact, targeted its rivals in vertical search, by adopting "a strategy of demoting or refusing to display, links to certain vertical websites in highly commercial categories."" Although the inadvertent disclosure attracted considerable public attention, there has been no indication the FTC or DOJ is planning to revisit the issue of search bias.
33
European Commission Investigation
In cording preferential placement to the results of its own vertical search services in order to shut out competing services. 35 While the European Commission conducted its investigation, there were additional complaints from other companies. 36 As part of its investigation, the European Commission explicitly identified search bias as an antitrust concern:
Google prominently displays links to its own specialised search services within its web search results and does not inform users of this favourable treatment. Due to the favourable treatment of Google's own services, consumers are more likely to not make use of potentially more relevant competing services. First, users are not aware of the promotion of Google's offer within the search results. Second, competitors' results that are potentially more relevant are less visible and even sometimes not directly visible to users they are more difficult for the user to find, for instance because the user has to scroll down the screen to see them or has to go to a subsequent search results web page.
The Commission is concerned that this practice unduly diverts traffic away from Google's competitors in specialised search towards Google's own specialised search services. It therefore reduces the ability of consumers to find a potentially more relevant choice of specialised search services. Since Google is an important source of traffic for competing specialised search services, this may reduce competitors' incentives to innovate in specialised search.
37
In April 2013, Google proposed to settle the E.C. investigation into search bias with a remedy blending architectural and labeling remedies. 38 Google proposed to:
(i) -label promoted links to its own specialised search services so that users can distinguish them from natural web search results, -clearly separate these promoted links from other web search results by clear graphical features (such as a frame), and -display links to three rival specialised search services close to its own services, in a place that is clearly visible to users, (ii) -offer all websites the option to opt-out from the use of all their content in Google's specialised search services, while ensuring that any opt-out does not unduly affect the ranking of those web sites in Google's general web search results, -offer all specialised search web sites that focus on product search or local search the option to mark certain categories of information in such a way that such information is not indexed or used by Google.
39
The European Commission solicited feedback on whether it should make Google's Commitments legally binding as part of a broader settlement of the issues raised in the investigation. Critics made it clear they were unsatisfied with the remedy proposed by Google. 4° The Google has ten weeks to respond to the SO, and may then seek a formal hearing.
48
D. Previous Research
We divide our summary of previous research on search bias into pure legal scholarship and empirical work.
Legal Scholarship
There are numerous academic articles on the issue of search bias/neutrality. 49 Critics have claimed that Google's dominance in algorithmic search has allowed it to foreclose opportunities for competitors and suggested that antitrust law provides a way to address such conduct. 5° Others have sug-
51
gested that the United States should create a federal search commission, or called for further government investigation of the frequency and severity of search bias. Most antitrust scholars have been skeptical of such claims; they have raised serious questions about the definition and frequency of search bias, the extent to which antitrust provides a useful remedy to the problem, to the extent it actually exists, and whether search bias is simply a form of vertical integration that has pro-competitive benefits. 53 IP and Internet scholars have argued that search is inherently dynamic and attempts to impose a "search neutrality" framework would not work well. 54 First Amendment scholars have argued that search (and the host of subjective judgments that inform search results) constitutes speech, and are accordingly constitutionally protected. 55 The issue of a remedy has attracted relatively little attention. Critics of the FTC and European Commission investigations have argued that search bias is a nonproblem-and even if it is a problem, any remedy will end up making consumers worse off. Enthusiasts of the investigations have claimed an effective remedy must either confine Google to its existing search markets, or force it to provide equal access to favored positions on the SRP-without devoting much attention to how precisely either of those things might be done-let alone quantifying the actual impact of doing so.
Empirical Research on Search Bias and Remedies
There is relatively little empirical research on search bias, and we could not locate any empirical research on the issue of remedies for search bias. 56. Although we have been unable to locate any empirical studies on the issue of remedies for search bias, there is an extensive literature on the effectiveness of disclosure remedies. This literature has obvious implications for the (routinely proposed) remedy of prominently labeling search results to more clearly indicate their provenance. In general, this literature finds that disclo-
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Part of the difficulty is determining what is meant by "search bias." What actually counts as "neutral search?" Is it bias for a search engine to have any preference whatsoever for links that it has some connection with (i.e., for "affiliated links")? In the limiting case, is it bias for a search engine to "hard code" the appearance of affiliated links at the top of the algorithmic results? If it turns out that all search engines give some preference to affiliated links, does that indicate that all search engines are biased, or that no search engines are biased? Should search engines that proclaim they provide objective results be held to a different standard than search engines that do not make such promises?
There are also daunting philosophical questions lurking in the definition of search bias. Consider one obvious difficulty. Suppose that when Google launched its original search engine in 1998, it included the full panoply of vertical searches and preferences for affiliated links that it deployed over the subsequent seventeen years. Would that initial decision by Google result in search bias? On what theory? If not, why should the fact that Google subsequently added those vertical searches and preferences for affiliated links give rise to a phenomenon that some people have collectively decided to call "search bias?" Stated differently, to what extent is the timing and sequencing of innovation doing the work of creating the controversy? Luckily (for the reader), such metaphysical questions are beyond the scope of this article. Instead, they are raised to flag some of the complexities that underlie the facile label of "search bias."
Putting the metaphysical questions aside, we identified three studies that offer an empirical perspective on the issue of search bias. In the first study, Edelman and Lockwood picked thirty-two search terms that they expected to have a high degree of references to affiliated links, and ran them through five search engines (Google, Bing, Yahoo, AOL, and Ask). 57 They analyzed the top algorithmic link, the first three algorithmic links, and the first page of algorithmic links. 58 Across all search engines, they found that 19% of links refer to a search engine's affiliated links. 59 Focusing on the first algorithmic link, they find that Google refers to its affiliated links about twice as often as Yahoo and Bing refer to Google content in this position. 60 However, they also find that Yahoo refers to its affiliated links more often than Google if one considers the entirety of the first page. 61 Edelman and Lockwood conclude that sure remedies are entirely ineffective except when they are counterproductive. We refer interested readers to a first-rate review and synthesis of this literature. 
Search Bias and the Limits of Antitrust their findings indicate that Google intentionally places its affiliated links first,
62
which they treat as prima facie evidence of search bias.
Wright replicated Edelman and Lockwood's study using three search engines (Bing, Google and Blekko), and noted significant changes in the search engine environment in the year between the two studies. 63 However, in addition to the thirty-two search terms selected by Edelman and Lockwood, he also studied a random sample of 1,000 Google search queries. 64 while Bing did so more than twice as often. When considering the entire first page, the bias for affiliated links was similar for Google and Bing.
69
Why did Wright obtain such different results than Edelman and Lockwood? Some of the difference is likely attributable to the passage of a year and the accompanying evolution in search. Some of the difference may also be attributable to differences in study design (e.g., analyzing the first link versus the first page of search output). But, the largest difference is almost certainly attributable to the sample used by Edelman and Lockwood versus Wright. Edelman and Lockwood studied thirty-two search terms selected because they were likely to trigger affiliated links. Wright tested the same thirty-two search terms, but his primary dataset was a random sample of 1,000 actual searches.
Each approach has strengths and weaknesses. Edelman and Lockwood are like Willie Sutton-they are looking for evidence of search bias where it is most likely to occur. The strength of this approach is that if researchers do not find evidence of search bias where it is most likely to occur, they can be confident it is not occurring at all. Conversely, the nonrandom nature of the search terms means that even if Edelman and Lockwood had been able to find evidence of search bias, they would have been unable to draw any conclusion about the actual prevalence of search bias as experienced by the average user.
What about Wright's random sample of 1,000 searches? Because a large number of searches are idiosyncratic, a random sample will include many searches made by only a few users. Although a random sample better captures the experience of the average search engine user, the prevalence of idiosyn- 
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cratic searches means that even a significant degree of search bias can go undetected. In 2013, Edelman and Lai released a new study, analyzing the impact of GFS on click-through rates (CTRs) to online travel agencies and airlines. 70 Beginning in December 2011, GFS was hard coded to appear above the top algorithmic link in response to specific qualifying searches (e.g., "flights to Orlando"). The GFS listings presented information on air carriers, flights, and price quotes in an interactive box that allowed users to check fares on various dates and filter the results.
Using a large dataset aggregated from actual search engine usage by a panel of users, Edelman and Lai studied the impact of GFS on CTRs to 23 popular travel sites, composed of 17 online travel agencies and 6 large U.S. airlines. 71 They found that the introduction of GFS reduced uncontrolled CTRs on nonpaid algorithmic links for these 23 sites from 5.5% to 3.5% (a drop of 36%), while CTRs on paid links for these 23 sites increased from 3% to 6.4% (an increase of 113%). 72 When they performed a regression analysis including appropriate controls, they found that the introduction of GFS increased CTRs on paid links for these 23 sites from 6.1% to 11.3% (an 85% increase) and decreased CTRs on unpaid links for these 23 sites from 6.2% to 2.2% (a 65% decrease). 73 Further analysis indicated that GFS had a larger impact on the sites that received the most traffic from the search terms. These three studies help cast light on the frequency of search bias-but they say little or nothing about possible remedies, and the trade-offs of using architectural versus labeling remedies. We now turn to those issues.
II. METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
A. Overview
We conducted two interactive online surveys/simulations during February 2013 and March 2013. The authors were responsible for designing and analyzing the surveys/simulations. A private firm administered the surveys/ simulations. 74 Appendix A summarizes basic demographic information about participants. A broad cross-section of the population was obtained. Both surveys/simulations asked approximately forty substantive questions, followed by eight demographic questions. The survey/simulation began by asking respondents to turn off any ad blocker they were using, and then asked a series of questions about their use of ad blocking software, their preferred search engine, and whether they could recall seeing various labels used by search engines to identify paid content. Respondents were randomly as- signed to one of two search scenarios (i.e., either "Nikon camera" or "London Fog") and directed to a website displaying a virtual Google search environment. 75 Each participant was asked to run a Google search using their assigned search term and click on the link they would have selected if they were interested in obtaining information on the specified product. Respondents were then asked to rerun the same simulated search and click on the link they would have selected if they were interested in purchasing the specified product. The results captured the specific link that respondents clicked in response to these questions, and mapped the clicked links to specific regions of the SRP. 
75.
We used Google because it is the most popular search engine and has been the target of investigations of search bias by both the FTC and the European Commission. The virtual Google search environment looked exactly like a Google SRP, except we omitted the left-side column in the search output page. This was to ensure sufficient space was available to display the entirety of the center and right-side columns. However, in this paper, we consistently refer to columns as they would appear in a normal Google search (i.e., the center column and the right-side column). We refer to the website as a "virtual Google search environment" because the SRP was identical to an actual Google SRP, apart from our manipulation of labeling and architecture. London Fog a' Aura/in (01
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The images for the 1st survey/simulation were identical, except the Google Shopping Region was on the right side of the SRP. In both Figures 1 and 2 , the Google Shopping region appears immediately below the colored region in the center column. The main difference between the two images is that the image for Nikon camera (Figure 1 ) has three paid ads in the Google Shopping region v. one paid ad in the London Fog Google Shopping region (Figure 2 ).
We then explored the impact of architectural and labeling remedies on click-through rates. Respondents repeatedly reran the same search, and were presented with a series of five (1st survey/simulation) or seven (2nd survey/simulation) variations of the SRP. Within each survey/simulation, SRP variations were presented in random order to reduce the impact of any order effect. In each instance, respondents were asked to click on the link they would have chosen if they were interested in purchasing the product in question.
We focused on the Google Shopping region, which has been the source of multiple complaints about search bias. Indeed, as noted previously, the European Commission's SO focused exclusively on Google Shopping. As evident in Figures 1 and 2 , the Google Shopping region is labeled "Shop for [nikon camera or london fog] on Google" at the left upper margin of the Shopping region. There is a separate "Sponsored" label at the upper right-hand margin of the Shopping region. We refer to the label at the left upper margin of the London og icia, onine OLI , oas ac es an ccesso ies
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Shopping region as the "Google-native label" in the balance of this article. 77 For the first variation, the Google-native labels were changed to "Paid Ads for nikon camera by Google Comparison Shopping TM ' and "Paid Ads for london fog by Google Comparison Shopping TM ." ' Our goal was to make it clear that the contents represented paid content. This variation is referred to as the "Google-tweaked label." Figure 3 shows the SRP, with an enlarged view of the Google-tweaked label. The only change made was to the Google Shopping label; otherwise , http://searchengineland.com/google-shopping--thebalance-between-old-new-129011. It kept using "Ads" for non-Shopping paid content in the topcenter and right-side columns. Id. In effect, this means that since May 2012, Google has been simultaneously using two different labels ("Ads" and "Sponsored") to indicate paid content.
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The next variation was a "fanciful control" that had the same content and appearance as Google Shopping, but was labeled to make it clear that it was not a Google-affiliated entity (i.e., "Paid Ads for nikon camera by Netcompare Shopping TM"). Figure 4 shows the SRP, with an enlarged view of the Netcompare label. The only change made was to the label; otherwise Figure 4 is identical to Figures 1 and 3 . Below, this variation is referred to as the "Netcompare" label. We also evaluated the impact of page architecture by showing respondents images with both the Netcompare and Google Shopping regions. Figure 5 shows the SRP, with an enlarged view of the two Shopping regions (in this instance, the Shopping regions bear the Google-native and Netcompare labels, with the Google-native labeled region on top). We also flipped the order of the Shopping regions (i.e., putting the Netcompare Shopping region on top).
Finally, we experimented with the labels. 7 To avoid excessive variation, the 78. We tested the Google-native label and the Google-tweaked label against the full Netcompare label for London Fog, and the Google-native label and the Google-tweaked label against a shortened version of the Netcompare label for Nikon camera. After respondents viewed all the SRP variations listed in Table 1 , they were shown an image of an SRP with each section labeled, and asked to identify which sections contained paid content. Respondents saw three SRPs, differing in the labeling of the Shopping region (i.e., we tested the Google-native, Google-tweaked, and Netcompare labels). We then asked respondents whether they recalled seeing certain labels during the course of the survey/simulation.
JURIMETRICS
The final set of questions requested demographic information. Table 1 provides some basic statistics on completion rates and the significance of ad-blocker software. Both surveys/simulations had an unusually high initial drop-out rate. More than half of those who were invited to participate and clicked through declined to proceed after they were told they would need to disable their ad-blocker software. 79 The firm we used to administer the survey/simulation indicated that its usual drop-out rate is approximately 25-33%. It is unclear how many of those who dropped out did so because they use ad blocker and did not wish to turn it off, or do not use ad blocker but were put off by a survey/simulation that requested them to disable something on their computer. so 79. We excluded respondents who would not turn off ad-blocker software from our survey because we believed the software might interfere with the rendering of the Google Shopping region for some (but not all) respondents.
B. Findings
Ad-Blocker Usage and Baseline Label Knowledge
80. In subsequent research, we found similar drop-out rates even when we did not require respondents to turn off ad blocker. Use ad-blocker software (% of usable) 23% 21%
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Completion rate 62% 58%
Usable completion rate 54% 52% Basic statistics on those who initiated and completed surveys/simulations conducted during February and March 2013. Respondents that "quit after learning they had to disable ad blocker" did not submit responses to any questions. In two instances, the survey/simulation results reported a single stray answer; those respondents were treated as "quit after learning they had to disable Ad blocker." "Completed" means respondents clicked through to the end, even if they did not answer each question. "Usable" is limited to those who answered all questions, and took at least five minutes to complete. Mean (median) completion time for usable surveys/simulations was 14 minutes (12 minutes). Completion rate = Completed/(Initiated but did not complete + Completed). Usable completion rate = Usable/(Initiated but did not complete + Completed).
Regardless, as Table 2 indicates, roughly 22% of those who completed the survey/simulation use ad-blocker software. We consider this figure to be a plausible lower-bound estimate of the percentage of the general population employing ad-blocker software."
We excluded respondents who did not take at least five minutes to complete the survey/simulation on the grounds they were probably not taking the questions seriously. However, our results are not materially affected by whether we include or exclude such individuals. Once we exclude those who did not answer a single question and those with nonusable results (because they did not answer all questions or completed the survey/simulation too quickly), the completion rate was 54% in the 1st survey/simulation and 52% in the 2nd survey/simulation. If everyone that completed the survey/simulation is included, regardless of how long they took and regardless of whether they answered each question, the response rate rises to 62% in the 1st survey/simulation and 58% in the 2nd survey/simulation.
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81. We think this is a lower-bound estimate because we assumed those who opted out of the surveys after being asked to turn off their ad-blocker software were at least as likely to use ad blocker as those who ultimately participated in the surveys. Table 3 presents respondents' self-reported preferred search engine and their degree of familiarity with how search results are organized and labeled. As expected, Google is the clear favorite, with Yahoo and Bing a distant second and third respectively. We found a broad range of self-reported familiarity with the organization and labeling of search engine results, with 72-74% of respondents indicating they were moderately, very, or extremely familiar.
Interestingly, more sophisticated users are more likely to use ad blocking software. Although Table 2 shows an overall ad-blocker usage rate of 22%, when we analyzed usage by self-reported familiarity with the organization and labeling of search results, we found only 11% of respondents who selfreported they were "not at all familiar" with the way search results are organized and labeled used ad blocker, compared to 33% of respondents who selfreported that they were "extremely familiar."
To what extent do respondents actually notice labels? Respondents were asked whether they had seen six specific labels in the past month or two of Internet usage. Table 4 presents the results. The labels that were actually in use during this period are set in boldface. Recollection of labels seen in the last month or two before the survey/simulation date, for both 1st and 2nd survey/simulation combined, and for those with usable survey/simulation responses. Labels in actual use during the period in question are bolded. Respondents could select more than one label, so results sum to more than 100%.
Confirming our earlier work on this subject, Table 4 indicates that respondents pay little attention to the labels being used by search engines to indicate paid content.
2 The single most popular response, chosen by 48% of all respondents, was a label that had not been in use since November 2010 (i.e., "Sponsored Links").
8 3 Only 40% of respondents chose the label currently used by
Google to mark non-Shopping paid content ("Ads") and far fewer chose the labels currently used by Google Shopping and Yahoo Shopping (26% and 19% respectively). 8 4 Thirty-nine percent of people chose a label used only by
Yahoo ("Sponsored Results"), even though only 13% of respondents identified
Yahoo as their preferred search engine. 8 5 Almost 20% of respondents admitted they had not noticed any labels. Finally, 26% of respondents reported seeing a label that has never been used ("Commercial Ads").
Baseline Click-Through Behavior
To assess the impact of architecture and labeling on behavior, it is necessary to set a baseline. Table 5 presents the results when we asked respondents to click on a link if they were seeking to obtain information ("looking") or purchase the specified product ("buying"), and it computes the difference when Google Shopping is located in the center column versus the right column of the SRP. For ease of analysis, Table 5 and subsequent tables combine the results for Nikon camera and London Fog, although we note below when we observe material differences. 85. It is possible that survey participants were responding to the use of the word "Sponsored," which was used by Google to designate paid content ("Sponsored Links") before November 2010, and then used since May 2012 to designate the Google Shopping region. (0.12) Percentage of click-through for identified regions of the SRP in the 1st and 2nd surveys/simulations, in response to questions on location that respondents would click on if they were interested in obtaining information about the specified product (Nikon camera or London Fog) or buying the specified product. Limited to usable surveys. Non-Shopping Paid = region of the SRP marked as Ads, whether located in the colored box on top of the center column or on the right-side column of search results.
As Table 5 indicates, respondents were most likely to click on algorithmic links, whether the question was about looking or buying, and whether Google Shopping was located in the center column or in the right column of the SRP. However, CTRs on Google Shopping were much higher when it was placed in the center column of the SRP, whether the question was about looking or buying. 86 Although the absolute frequency of clicks on Google Shopping was modest, the percentages for "buying" were almost double those for "looking.", 8 7 The differences in CTRs when Google Shopping is in the center column versus the right column are statistically significant for algorithmic links 86. For those who were looking, 58% clicked on algorithmic links when Google Shopping was in the center column versus 65% when Google Shopping was in the right column. For those who were buying, 47% clicked on algorithmic links when Google Shopping was in the center column versus 55% when Google Shopping was in the right column.
87. For those who were looking, 7% clicked on Google Shopping when it was in the center column versus 4% when it was in the right column. For those who were buying, 13% clicked on Google Shopping when it was in the center column versus 7% when it was in the right column.
and Google Shopping, and for Non-Shopping Paid Ads for looking (but not buying).88
In unreported analysis, we do observe some statistically significant differences in the click-through patterns for Non-Shopping Paid Ads and algorithmic links for respondents who saw the Nikon SRP versus the London Fog SRP. In both the 1st and 2nd survey/simulation, we find a substantially higher CTR on Non-Shopping Paid Ads (and a reduction in CTR on algorithmic links) for Nikon camera, compared to the CTRs for London Fog. 89 We suspect this is because the colored paid ads region in the center column of the Nikon camera SRP (Figure 1 ) has three links, while the same region in the London Fog SRP (Figure 2 ) only has one link. 
Effect of Labeling and Architecture on Click-Through
We first present results for the images that had a single Shopping region (whether Google or Netcompare Shopping). Table 6 presents the results for four different scenarios: (1) Google-native label, (2) Google-tweaked label, (3) Netcompare, and (4) no Shopping region whatsoever.
88.
When we compare click-through rates (CTRs) for information versus buying in the 1st and 2nd surveys, we find the differences (decreases for algorithmic links, and increases for nonShopping paid ads, and Google Shopping) are statistically significant at a level of p <0.01.
89. In the 1st survey, for Nikon camera, the CTR for Non-Shopping Paid Ads (looking) was 36%, versus 46% for buying. For London Fog, the corresponding figures were 20% and 27%. In the 2nd Survey, for Nikon camera, the CTR for Non-Shopping Paid Ads (looking) was again 36%, versus 46% for buying. For London Fog, the corresponding figures were 27% and 31%. All of these differences were statistically significant at a level of p < 0.01.
90. Cf supra Figures 1 and 2 . When we examine CTRs on a per-link basis, we find roughly comparable click-through frequency for the first paid ad in the center colored region of the SRP for both Nikon camera and London Fog. Thus, the higher CTR for Nikon camera compared to London Fog is likely attributable to the presence of the 2nd and 3rd links in the center colored region of the SRP for Nikon camera. 
13%
Other 1% 1% 1% 1% Percentage of click-through for identified regions of the SRP when respondents were asked where they would click if they were interested in buying the specified product (Nikon camera or London Fog). Limited to usable surveys/simulations. Non-Shopping Paid Ads = region of the SRP marked as ads, whether located in the colored box on top of the center column or on the right side column of search results. Shopping label refers to whether the Shopping region bears label of Googlenative, Google-tweaked, Netcompare, or is missing entirely (2nd survey/simulation only). Label version refers to whether the Google label is native or tweaked, as defined above. The 1st survey/simulation had 1,098 usable responses. The 2nd survey/simulation had 747 usable responses. All percentages are relative to those figures. Table 6 reveals several significant findings. First, modifying the Google Shopping label to make it crystal clear that this region includes paid content does not materially affect click-through frequency. 91 Second, changing the label to a fanciful control (Netcompare) does not materially affect the CTR.
92
Third, the CTR on the Shopping region is substantially higher when it is in the center column of the SRP, compared to when it is in the right column of the SRP. 93 Finally, when Google Shopping is absent, most of those who would have otherwise clicked on Google Shopping instead click on an algorithmic 91. In the 1st survey, the CTR for Google-native was 7% and the CTR for Google-tweaked was 10%. In the 2nd survey, the CTR for Google-native was 13% and the CTR for Googletweaked was 15%. These differences are not statistically significant.
92. In the 1st survey, the CTR for Netcompare was 11%. In the 2nd survey, the CTR was 13%. These figures are similar to those for both the Google-native and Google-tweaked labels, and the difference is not statistically significant.
93. When the Shopping region was in the center column, the CTR ranged from 13 15%. When it was in the right column, the CTR ranged from 7-11%. The differences between CTRs on the Shopping region in the 1st survey versus the 2nd survey were statistically significant for Google native and Google Shopping but not for Netcompare.
link. 94 Taken together, these findings suggest that consumer decision making (and CTRs) are driven more by the architecture and layout of the SRP (i.e., the location of the shopping region) than by the way in which specific regions of the SRP are labeled.
To probe this issue further, we also tested SRPs with both the Google Shopping and Netcompare Shopping regions-and alternated which Shopping region was on top and which label was used to indicate the Google Shopping region. 
5%
Shopping Netcompare 4% 4% 9%
2nd Survey/Simulation Google Shopping in Center S oogle 20% 10% 14% 5% Shopping Netcompare 7% 13% 7% 17% Percentage of click-through for identified regions of the SRP when respondents were asked where they would click if they were interested in buying the specified product (Nikon camera or London Fog). Limited to usable surveys/simulations. Two Shopping regions appear in each tested image. "Region on top" refers to which Shopping region label (i.e., Google-native, Google-tweaked, or Netcompare) is on top when two Shopping regions are displayed. Non-Shopping Paid = region of the SRP marked as Ads, whether located in the colored box on top of the center column or on the right side column of search results. The 1st survey/simulation had 1,098 usable responses. The 2nd survey/simulation had 747 usable responses. All percentages are relative to those figures.
94. In the 2nd survey/simulation, averaging across all labeling variations, when the Shopping region is present, roughly 47% of respondents clicked on an algorithmic link, 38% clicked on a Non-Shopping paid link, and 14% clicked on a Shopping link. When the Shopping region was removed, those 14% had to go somewhere and almost 80% of them clicked on an algorithmic link. The 80% figure is calculated as follows: first, compare the CTR on algorithmic links when Google Shopping is absent versus present (58% -47% = 11%). Then, divide that by the CTR on Google Shopping when it is present (14%). 11%/14% = 78.6%.
We did not test CTRs on a SRP without Google Shopping as part of the 1st survey/ simulation. However, if we assume the same algorithmic CTR as in the 2nd survey/simulation, that would mean that roughly 43% of those who previously clicked on Google Shopping ((58% -55%)/7%) would click on an algorithmic link if Google Shopping did not appear on the SRP.
95. In the interest of simplicity, Table 7 omits CTRs on the other regions of the SRP. In the 1st survey/simulation, with Google Shopping on the right side, algorithmic links accounted for 55% of clicks and Non-Shopping Paid Ads accounted for 30% of clicks across all tested variations. In the 2nd survey/simulation, with Google Shopping in the center, algorithmic links accounted for 37-42% of clicks and Non-Shopping Paid Ads accounted for 35 38% of clicks, depending on the tested variation. Table 7 confirms and extends the findings in Table 6 that architecture dominates labeling. In the 1st survey/simulation (where Shopping is on the right side of the SRP), the top Shopping region gets 9-12% of click-through (mean = 10%), and the bottom Shopping region gets 4-5% of click-through (mean = 4%). In the 2nd survey/simulation (where the Shopping region is in the center column of the SRP), the top Shopping region gets 13-20% of clickthroughs (mean = 16%), and the bottom Shopping region gets 5-10% of clickthroughs (mean = 7%). These patterns hold, irrespective of labeling.
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96 Stated differently, across our entire sample, the top Shopping region gets roughly 2.4 times as many clicks as the bottom Shopping region, independent of the location of the Shopping region on the SRP, and independent of how each Shopping region is labeled.
Label Effectiveness
How effective are the labels on the SRP at communicating information? Our previous research indicated that consumers paid little attention to labels on search output.
97 Table 4 makes it clear that respondents' recollection of labels currently in use is poor. But, this does not mean that "better" labels will be equally ineffective, nor should one assume that respondents are unable to differentiate between paid and unpaid content because they cannot properly recall labels that are currently in use. Accordingly, the study tested whether respondents were able to identify which sections of the search page were paid or unpaid. We presented respondents with a version of Figure 1 or Figure 2 , in which four regions of the SRP (right-side ads, center ads, Google Shopping, and Algorithmic links) were labeled with superimposed letters. 98 For each region, respondents were asked whether the specified region contained unpaid algorithmic content, paid content, unpaid content selected for them by Google's special marketing team (a fanciful control that we invented), or don't know/not sure. Table 8 presents the results for the three regions containing paid content (i.e., right-side ads, center ads, and Google Shopping). To simplify the presentation, Table 8 only provides percentages for those who correctly indicated the content was paid. 99 96. In the 2nd survey, where we have paired Google native/Google tweaked and Google native/Netcompare, with Google native on top and bottom in each, we find a statistically significant increase in CTRs from being on top, irrespective of labeling. We find no statistically significant impact on the CTR on algorithmic and Non-Shopping Paid Ads.
97. See Franklyn & Hyman, Trademarks as Keywords, supra note 8, at 484. 98. We tested both the Google-native and the Google-tweaked labels. Examples of the images that were shown are available from the authors on request.
99. Thus, Table 8 does not provide a breakdown of the percentages for those who believed a region containing paid content was instead (i) unpaid links selected by Google's Special Marketing Team (our fanciful control); (ii) algorithmic content; or (iii) selected "don't know/not sure."
Across both surveys, roughly 19% of respondents selected the fanciful control (Google's Special Marketing Team), 16% selected algorithmic content, and 13% selected don't know/not sure. Center 2nd 31% 36% Percentage that correctly answered whether the specified region of the SRP in the 1st and 2nd surveys/simulations was paid versus unpaid, with Shopping region labeled with either Googlenative or Google-tweaked labels. The 1st survey/simulation had 1,098 usable responses. The 2nd survey/simulation had 747 usable responses. All percentages are relative to those figures.
As Table 8 indicates, respondents struggled to identify paid content. Averaging across both surveys/simulations and all paid regions, only 48% of respondents correctly identified whether a paid region was, in fact, paid. When looking at cumulative performance the results were even worse, with only 13-20% of respondents correctly identifying all three paid regions.l°°R espondents did worse with Google Shopping than they did with the center and right side Ads, but they did better with Google Shopping when it was in the right column than when it was in the center column.
1 0 1 This finding likely reflects the impact of consumer expectations regarding architecture, with respondents assuming that the right-hand column of the SRP contains paid content. Tweaking the Google Shopping label to make it obvious that it included paid content increased the number of respondents that responded correctly, but the figures are still unimpressive. 1 02 100. If we limit ourselves to analyzing the SRP with the Google-native label for Google Shopping, there are three regions in each of the 1 st and 2nd surveys that include only paid content. Only 20% of respondents correctly identified all three paid regions in the 1st survey, and only 13% of respondents did so in the 2nd survey. We discuss the extent to which demographic and other factors predict better performance in identifying paid regions of the SRP in Part JJ.B.6, infra.
101. For Google Shopping, the percentage of correct responses (averaging Google native and Google Shopping) was 51% when it was located in the right column and 34% when it was located in the center column. For Ads, the corresponding results were 52% (right column) and 55% (center column).
102. As Table 8 reflects when Google Shopping was in the right column of the SRP, tweaking the label increased the percentage of correct responses from 47% to 55%. When Google Shopping was in the center column, tweaking the label increases the percentage of correct responses from 31% to 36%. Although these increases are statistically significant, the level of overall performance is still modest.
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Finally, respondents were asked whether they could recall labels they seen over the course of these survey/simulation. We provided respondents with twelve separate labels: nine of which they had seen and three of which they had not.
1 0 3 Table 9 presents the responses to this question, combining both surveys. Labels that were actually seen are bolded, as are the correct answers. Paid ads for xx 26% 55% 19% Table 9 provides additional evidence that respondents were not paying attention to labels. Despite repeated exposure, five of the eight labels that were used were not noticed by a majority of respondents. And, a sizeable number of respondents believed they had seen two labels that were not actually used (i.e., Sponsored Links and Sponsored Results). 104 Averaged across all labels, only 48% of respondents remembered seeing a label that was used-while 44% of respondents remembered seeing labels that were not used. However, compared to Table 4 , we observe across-the-board improvements in recall (i.e., increases in the percentage of respondents that recalled seeing a label that was presented, and decreases in the percentage of respondents that recalled seeing a label that was not presented). It remains to be seen how transient this improvement will turn out to be.
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103. For purposes of this question, we treated partial labels (e.g., "Google Comparison Shopping") as a correct response.
104. Interestingly, more respondents thought they had seen a label that wasn't used ("Sponsored Link") than one that was used ("Sponsored"), even though both labels contained the word "Sponsored."
Search Strategies
Search bias might not matter as much if respondents do not use search engines to locate products and services for purchase. Accordingly, we asked respondents how they would search for the product they had been randomly assigned as part of the survey/simulation. Table 10 provides the combined results from both surveys/simulations and confirms our expectation that most respondents do, in fact rely on search engines to locate products for purchase. Although we asked about "Other" preferred search strategies, we did not explicitly ask about specialized search engines, bookmarked sites, typing in known URLs, web display advertising, mobile apps, and links from other websites. It is possible that the percentages in Table 10 would be different if some of these alternatives had been explicitly listed. Even if users rely on search engines to identify products for purchase, architecture and labeling might not affect CTRs if users ignore or pay little attention to particular regions of the SRP. Accordingly, we asked respondents whether they completely ignored or paid less attention to links in particular regions of the SRP. Table 11 presents the results of this analysis. Because respondents could select more than one response, the percentages in Table 11 sum to more than 100%. Treat all equally 29% 28%
Percentage of usable survey/simulation responses that reported completely ignoring or paying much less attention to specified regions of SRP. Because respondents could select more than one answer, the figures sum to more than 100%. Table 11 indicates that most respondents paid more attention to algorithmic links than to paid content, and an appreciable number ignored or discounted all ads. Ad content in the right-hand column is particularly prone to be discounted by respondents. Of course, we are unable to quantify the impact of selfreported willingness to ignore or pay less attention to particular regions of the SRP on actual CTRs.
Regression Analysis
We conducted a Poisson regression to evaluate the extent to which various factors predicted better (or worse) performance in identifying paid content. Details of the regression are in Appendix B. We found that gender, race, education, age, and self-reported awareness of search results organization and labeling correlate with the ability to correctly identify paid regions of the SRP, and with recollection of labels encountered during the survey/simulation. Marital status, the presence of children in the household, and region of residency had no discernable effect on the ability to correctly identify paid regions or on label recollection.
To make these findings more accessible, we used the coefficients derived from our regression analysis to estimate the extent to which individuals with certain demographic attributes would know whether the three paid regions in a typical SRP were paid (i.e., the issue addressed in Table 8 ). Consumer protection law requires that paid content be clearly and conspicuously labeled. We used four distinct scenarios: (1) white male, (2) white female, (3) nonwhite male, and (4) nonwhite female. For each of these four scenarios, we present two variations:
* The individual has a masters or other graduate degree, and self-reports that they are moderately familiar with the way search results are organized and labeled. * The individual has a high school degree or less, and self-reports that they are unfamiliar with the way search results are organized and labeled. 
Il. DISCUSSION
A. Google Shopping and the Logic of Vertical Integration
At one time, a Google search returned a pristine set of algorithmic links. But, over time, Google has dramatically altered the appearance and substantive content of the SRP. In part, the change is the result of adding vertical search functions that are displayed above the algorithmic content. And, in part, the change is the result of expanding the share of real estate devoted to paid content on the SRP. Google Shopping sits at the intersection of these two developments, so it provides an ideal foundation for our study of the impact of architecture and labeling on consumer perceptions and behavior.
Strikingly, although Google Shopping occupies prime real estate (just above the algorithmic links) and has visually rich content, at most 13% of respondents clicked on it-with a much lower CTR when Google Shopping is in the right column. However, a substantial majority of those who clicked on Google Shopping would have clicked on an algorithmic link had Google Shopping not been present. Additionally, past research indicates that users are more likely to click to links closer to the top of the SRP. We take no position on whether in light of these factors, the CTR on Google Shopping is too little, too much, or just right-but our research does indicate that Google Shopping is not disproportionately cannibalizing Google's existing ads.
Vertical integration, of which Google's move from ten blue links to universal search is an example, can be pro-competitive and beneficial to consumers. 106 It remains to be seen whether Google Shopping is a pro-competitive example of this phenomenon. Certainly, the European Commission does not seem to think so.
The small number of respondents who click-through on Google Shopping, despite its favorable location and visually rich appearance, and the sizeable number of respondents who indicate they ignore or discount it suggest there may be less to this dispute than the ferocity of complaints might suggest. Further research will be necessary to fully assess that issue.
B. Impact of Search Page Architecture and Labeling
Search page architecture has a substantial impact on consumer behavior. Respondents expect to find paid content in the right-hand column and in the top colored box in the center column. Respondents expect to find unpaid content in the center column below the colored box. The figures in Table 8 when it was in the right column, versus 31% when Google Shopping was in the center column.
Respondents pay little attention to labels. Tweaking the label to make it obvious that Google Shopping included paid content increased these figures only modestly and did not materially affect CTRs.
1 0 7 And, the single most recalled label had not been used for more than two years at the time the surveys/simulations were conducted.
1 08 An appreciable number of respondents recalled seeing a label that has never been used. 0 9 Finally, respondents' ability to correctly identify which regions of the SRP included paid content was low, with worse results found among those with more limited education and less familiarity with the way search results are organized and labeled. All of these findings are consistent with extensive literature indicating that mandated disclosure often has no material impact, apart from unintended side effects." 1 0
We did not test the impact of shading of selected SRP regions on consumer behavior, so are not able to say anything specific about that issue. Additionally, Google's use of shading has changed over time."' That said, our working hypothesis is that shading, as long as it is dark enough to be readily visible, should have a larger effect on consumer perceptions and behavior than labeling, although not as large an effect as architecture. 112 Empirical testing will be necessary to confirm this hypothesis.
Regardless, if the goal is to clearly and conspicuously differentiate paid and unpaid content, it is not obvious why some paid regions have long been shaded, while others are not. Similarly, if the goal is to clearly and conspicu-ously differentiate paid and unpaid content, it is not obvious why different labels are used to indicate paid content in different regions of the SRP. This hodgepodge of strategies undermines the goal of clearly and conspicuously identifying paid content, and seems likely to lead to consumer confusion.
The fact that we find such a substantial effect from occupying the top spot in the Shopping region indicates that spot may not be readily shareable-and, shareability has long been an essential element of establishing a right to relief under the essential facilities doctrine. 113 But, in an online world, shareability has both structural and temporal attributes that can be readily manipulated. In another article, we test the shareability of the top spot, by splitting it in half vertically, and randomly allocating the left half to either Google or its competitors. After observing the CTR, we then flip-flop the allocation, and test the CTR again. This strategy has the potential to effectively create simultaneous real-time shareability-albeit in a way that is quite different from the conventional understanding of shareable property.
To be sure, architectural, labeling, and shading strategies must be evaluated individually. One should not assume that labeling is never effective and architecture and shading are always effective-or vice versa. That said, readers should not be optimistically biased about the likely efficacy of labeling for influencing consumer knowledge and behavior. To the extent competition policy has emphasized the importance of labeling, or assumed that clear labeling translates into consumer knowledge, our study provides considerable ground for skepticism.
C. Ad Blocker
For technical reasons, our study deliberately excluded all respondents that used ad-blocker software and would not turn it off. But, even the low-end estimate of ad-blocker usage (21% of users) indicates that many consumers have opted out of the ad-driven model that has sustained the two-sided market in which search engines and websites compete. It remains to be seen how the widespread use of ad blockers will affect the ability of search engines and websites to continue to provide free content and services to users. 114 
D. Consumer Protection in an Online World
Historically, consumer protection law has been based on a one-size-fits-all standardized mandatory minimum approach. But, in an online world, it is feasible to consider the possibility of less standardized consumer protections, with individuals selecting the particular level of protection they deem appropriate. One can certainly imagine an approach that "nudges" consumers in the direction of a particular set of default consumer protections, while allowing those who do not value the default protections to opt out. Such strategies have attracted interest from scholars of behavioral economics seeking a more choice-protecting form of regulation, while simultaneously trying to reduce opposition to the proposed regulations.
One obvious challenge in designing the nudges/choice architecture: how should one deal with the reality that many consumers know little (and care less) about the details of search page architecture and labeling? Attempts to protect consumers against rational ignorance, whether through defaults or otherwise, are unlikely to capture consumers' true preferences, since they do not have any. Instead, the choices that are made will reflect the preferences of those responsible for designing the defaults/choice architecture. We should stop pretending otherwise, the soothing claims of nudge/choice architecture enthusiasts to the contrary.
E. Implications of Our Findings for Other Legal Issues
Most users were unable to consistently and reliably distinguish between paid and unpaid content. This finding has implications for a number of other emerging legal issues. Consider "native advertising," in which paid content is presented in ways that suggest it is unpaid editorial content. 115 The FTC has expressed concern about native advertising, 11 6 and national advertising associations appear to be trying to preempt regulation by promulgating "best practices."
117 Our research suggests that the underlying problem (i.e., consumer confusion about paid versus unpaid content) is likely to be a real one-and that regulation to address it will prove to be difficult.
Our findings also suggest that labeling remedies, which have dominated discussion of native advertising, are likely to prove ineffective. In addition, a SPRING 2015 material number of consumers do not seem to care whether content is paid or unpaid-raising questions about the utility of standardized/universal approaches to consumer protection in this space. We are currently in the process of completing a study of whether consumers know that native advertising is paid content. We anticipate publishing our findings in a separate article.
Consumer confusion is also relevant to legal issues beyond native advertising. For example, to prove trademark infringement, one must show that consumers are confused about the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of the defendant's goods or services (i.e., they believe that the defendants' goods or services are actually those of the plaintiff). If search results are presented and labeled in ways that result in confusion about the source or sponsorship of goods or services, it will certainly affect whether users can navigate the online commercial environment with confidence and accuracy, and might well give rise to a claim under federal trademark law. Intentional confusion or blurring of the distinction between paid and unpaid search results might also give rise to liability under the law of deceptive trade practices, unfair competition law, or both.
The right of publicity (often invoked by celebrities and other famous people) is implicated as well. Advertisers have been known to use the names and likenesses of famous individuals in ways that suggest an endorsement of particular products or services. In a search environment where there is blurring of paid versus unpaid content, there is a significantly increased risk of creating false and misleading associations between advertised products or services, and targeted celebrity names and images. Celebrities that wish to protect their rights of publicity may be forced to spend an increased amount of time and money litigating these issues, compared to a world in which there is less blurring of paid versus unpaid content.
Finally, it is worth flagging the role of search engines and other entities in the blurring of the distinction between paid and unpaid content. Consumer perceptions are the result of deliberate decisions with regard to the architecture, labeling, and presentation of search results. Antitrust law has provided the main framework for analysis of the issues considered in this article, but consumer protection law almost certainly has something to say on the subject as well.
F. Implications of Our Findings for Regulatory Intervention
Our study indicates that labeling remedies are unlikely to be effective, while architectural remedies can have a substantial effect. These findings have obvious implications for the framing of a workable remedy, conditional on a finding that the law has been violated.
However, it is critical to understand that the availability of a workable remedy does not imply that using that (or any other) remedy is a good idea.118 118. Skeptics should consider the psychological impact of being armed with a hammer on the frequency with which one encounters nails, and other objects that are thought to require a good hard pounding.
There are sizeable error costs with regulatory interventions, particularly in a rapidly evolving field like search-and particularly when we are dealing with architectural remedies. The preferences of regulators (however well informed and public spirited they might be) are likely to differ-sometimes dramatically-from those of consumers. The limits of antitrust (and of those implementing the antitrust laws) are real.
119 Platonic guardians are in short supply, no matter how high the demand. 120
G. Future Research
This study took the basic structure of the Google Shopping region as a given, and only tested a limited set of architectural variations (right-side column versus center column; top versus bottom). We did not test shading or more dramatic changes to the Google Shopping region, such as stripping out the visually rich content of that region. As noted previously, the authors recently completed a study of several "Commitments" proposed by Google in its settlement proposal to the European Commission, as well as other variations, and anticipate publishing the results of that study separately.
H. Limitations of Our Work
All empirical work has limitations, and this study is no exception. Our findings are only as good as the questions we asked. We rely on respondents to answer questions honestly and accurately. We only tested two search termsboth of which were for high-end, trademarked products. We only manipulated the architecture and labeling of the Google Shopping region. We might obtain different results with different search terms, or if we had modified other vertical search alternatives provided by Google. Although we simulated the experience of conducting a search and presented the variations on existing search results in random order, these were not real searches. We did not directly observe real-world CTRs, let alone conduct A/B testing.
Finally, the study only tested initial CTRs. Assume that users click through on Google Shopping (rather than on the link they would click in the absence of Google Shopping), and do not find what they were expecting or 119. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tx. L. REV. 1, 39 (1984) ("Antitrust is an imperfect tool for the regulation of competition. Imperfect because we rarely know the right amount of competition there should be, because neither judges nor juries are particularly good at handling complex economic arguments, and because many plaintiffs are interested in restraining rather than promoting competition."). what we should not be doing. As judges, they simply do too much: they muddy the law in trying to fix it, and they worsen the law by encouraging (through example) their less talented peers to do so as well.").
hoping to find. Will a material number of users click back or rerun the search and then click on a different link (in which case the initial click on Google Shopping causes delay but not permanent diversion)?
12 1 Or will they "settle" for what they find after they click on Google Shopping? Only the latter scenario seems likely to give rise to antitrust concerns, even under the more restrictive framework employed by the European Commission.
The complications do not end there. Determining whether those who do not click back are "settling" is virtually impossible, given the absence of a baseline against which their decisions can be measured. Finally, if a material number of users click back or rerun their search, the amounts that advertisers are willing to pay for inclusion in the Google Shopping region will be reduced-which may prompt Google to improve the quality of the results found in Google Shopping, further undermining the claim for antitrust intervention.
122 Further research will be necessary to determine how best to study the impact of repeat interactions on CTRs.
The dispute over the diagnosis and treatment of search bias has involved a great deal of spirited advocacy, but relatively little in the way of objective evidence. For those who believe that search bias raises competition policy concerns, our study provides insight into the complexities of search and the degree to which architectural and labeling remedies are likely to be effectiveas well as pointing out some of the significant difficulties with crafting such remedies. For those who are skeptical that search bias raises competition policy concerns, our study provides additional reasons to tread cautiously. For people who have not yet made up their minds, our findings point to the central role that SRP architecture plays in users' mental processing of search results, and the difficulties of dislodging consumer expectations that have become effectively hardwired through repeated exposure.
JURIMETRICS
121. Alternatively, they might switch to a different search engine, and rerun the search. 122. These matters are, of course complex. Cf Edelman & Lai, supra note 70, at 29 30 (developing theoretical model for circumstances when a search engine will divert users to less relevant results). 
APPENDIX A. DEMOGRAPHICS OF RESPONDENTS
